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It's really impractical to compare when you consider that the first concrete plans for the line date back to 1990 or 1991, and the okay from government was given in 1995.I know it is impractical to compare, but China built Beijing–Shanghai HSR (1,318 km) in 4 years (2008–2011), about the same length and on similar (flat) terrains...
We won't be able to do the same, but doubling that (8 - 9 years) would not be unreasonable. Oh well...
Well, formal feasibility studies and discussions took place throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. The project was officially approved by the Chinese government in 2006, with construction beginning in April 2008 and the railway opening on June 30, 2011.It's really impractical to compare when you consider that the first concrete plans for the line date back to 1990 or 1991, and the okay from government was given in 1995.
But yeah, keep using those misleading figures....
Dan
No they are not. That's why I am ok with 9 to 10 years here, which doubles what the Chinese did. But 14, most likely 20 is just absurd.I doubt the Chinese government is burdened by environmental studies, legal challenges, labour issues and competing interests. They also benefit from a very strong economy thanks in large part to us giving up our manufacturing base to them.
I don't get the insistence that a country must first pass through the steps of 1930s USA, or 1970s Italy and Germany. There is path dependency here, you can't mandate it as the normative thing, the intermediate steps which were rational evolutions of this-and-that railway network a lifetime ago are not necessarily the most viable today, in a different country with different conditions (like the need to rebuild vast lengths of long-abandoned railway in order to get to a basic level, and doing so in a way that locks in less-than-stellar speed). And there is more diversity in the pre-HSR conditions than you pretend; I suppose the SNCF was filled with terrible hubris, leaping into the TGV with the Paris-Lyon timetable looking like this.We’ve known since the Ecotrain Study that the cost of building HSR far exceeds the amounts any government in Canada would be willing to pay and again multiplying its price tag by adding more detail to all figures won’t help with that inevitable result.
The biggest (and most counter-productive) misconception about HFR was that it was intended to act as a substitute for HSR rather than the first incremental step towards it, by creating a service quality which resembles the semi-fast and roughly hourly intercity services which preceded HSR in Italy, Germany and the Northeast Corridor. Mercilessly scopecreeping HFR into HSR just represents the elimination of the first few steps towards the same goal while optimistically hoping that we’ll be able to jump four steps at once and then run the remainder of the stair up.
There are only two reasons why any consortium of developers and investors would still participate in this scope creep orgy, despite the clear lack of governmental will and ability to even fund half of the $80+ billion price tag: either because they really believe that they will be able to finance $40+ billion for this mega project or because the termination fee is the more juicy target. I increasingly suspect it’s the latter for Cadence, especially given the rumours I’m hearing from the HFR-TGF (now: ALTO) corner, which is why I’m inclined to say that the stated preferences of the bidders won’t matter at all because neither the governments nor their investors can possibly commit the scale of capital funding required for such a hopelessly overambitious project…
They are meaningful because they're comparisons to a country with a very strong capacity for infrastructure creation and a high level of infrastructure investment. They are made less useful by differences in developmental state, and, yes, political structure, but it's counterproductive to dismiss them out of hand.These constant comparisons to China are pointless unless of course the argument is that we need an authoritarian state. If we want actual useful comparisons we should be looking to what other democracies have done. And not just Britain and California.
The China Railway faces environmental studies (such that the Ministry of Environment halted work on two HSLs over them in 2011); legal-political challenges (such that HSLs' openings were delayed and top speeds reduced on the basis of previous chicanery and ministerial corruption), and certainly from competing interests - see the same subterfuge previously mentioned. The industrial relations environment favours the railway more though. No need to pretend that it's only through "our" kindness or folly that Chinese industrialisation has happened either; it is a country with its own strengths of its own right, and the world does not revolve around us.I doubt the Chinese government is burdened by environmental studies, legal challenges, labour issues and competing interests. They also benefit from a very strong economy thanks in large part to us giving up our manufacturing base to them.
The Beijing-Shanghai HSL was rushed, and there were things that would be definitely intolerable today in China, let alone here, like the apparent battles between workers and locals over expropriation. Some of the things that also allow for faster construction, like say the huge use of viaducts where embankments might also be fine, also drive up costs, such that Chinese HSLs tend to be much more expensive when adjusted for purchasing power than their French or Spanish counterparts.Well, formal feasibility studies and discussions took place throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. The project was officially approved by the Chinese government in 2006, with construction beginning in April 2008 and the railway opening on June 30, 2011.
When did our feasibility studies and discussion take place? 1960s? So the line opened 5 years after the official approval. Doubling that would be 10. Yet we scheduled 14 and in reality it might be 20.
2006 was when the decision to go with high speed rail over maglev was made.Well, formal feasibility studies and discussions took place throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. The project was officially approved by the Chinese government in 2006, with construction beginning in April 2008 and the railway opening on June 30, 2011.
Case-in-point, Indonesia's HSR which opened in 2023 after first being considered as early as 2008. Both China and Japan intensely bid to support, with China only entering the bidding process in 2015. At some point here people need to get over their cope and understand that China is very good at building these things.A more meaningful comparison for Canada might be to other Pacific Rim countries with much lower GDP, who have managed to fund and operate high speed trains, often with Chinese design and construction assistance. Canada pales to any of these.
if you want a euro spin on this debate look at the Al Boraq in Morocco which was built by the French. 15 years from the first daydream to opening.Case-in-point, Indonesia's HSR which opened in 2023 after first being considered as early as 2008. Both China and Japan intensely bid to support, with China only entering the bidding process in 2015. At some point here people need to get over their cope and understand that China is very good at building these things.
If the train was running every hour or more, at what point would the demand require bilevel coaches? How long of single coaches would be the max length it should be?Not sure what proposals have been floated for train sets as yet for the Sharbot Lake Express, but a friend on mine working in the EU flipped me some thoughts on the new, just introduced Alstrom TGV M for French Railways. 320 kmh and a double decker. A GO train after a major steroid boost. I gather this upgraded high speed train has been in developement for a few years and trainsets for SNCF are now about to be, or shortly to be introduced to revenue service.
Bi-level would be the next major addition to Chinese CRH. Capacity issues abound on many of the major connections and this would be one method of adding capacity.
