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innsertnamehere

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Here, warning that it is a large PDF:

http://www.neptis.org/sites/default/files/metrolinx_review_2013/review_of_metrolinxs_big_move_neptis_foundation_schabas.pdf




Couple of key criticisms with it: it accounts for new riders only, and does not properly weigh service improvements for existing customers. It focuses on regional transit more than on local transit, often advocating for the removal of several stops on lines. He also seems to disregard existing political enviroments, and how deeply politicized transit planning is.


SHEPPARD LRT / SCARBOROUGH SUBWAY

I found this odd as it says that the Sheppard LRT is overkill, then goes on to suggest replacing it with the Scarborough Wye, an even higher order transit mode. Regardless, it is interesting. the report essentially says that the Sheppard LRT will attract few new riders upon its opening, and that it will offer little in terms of time savings. I can essentially agree with most points, though I believe it downplays time savings. Regardless, the trip time will still be too long. His advocation for ALRT technology is interesting. If the Wye is coupled with an ALRT Tech Crosstown, the transfer-to-downtown can still only be 1. He fails to mention this however, and treats the two lines as separate, suggesting a transfer will be required at Kennedy. As is predictable, he highly criticizes the Scarborough Subway, saying that commute times will still be too long for suburban commuters to switch from their cars and that it adds few riders to the system despite its huge costs.


EGLINTON CROSSTOWN:

Similar to Sheppard / Scarborough, The report advocates for Eglinton to be switched to ALRT and the surface portion be elevated. It also suggests dropping Chaplin, Oakwood, and Avenue stations due to little new ridership coming from them. This is a flawed approach however, as existing riders must be served as well. I'll touch on that later. The plan is interesting, but politically infeasible. The repercussions of significantly changing (and therefor delaying) the Crosstown will be large, and though the report argues otherwise, likely not worth the effort.

FINCH LRT

The report argues that little new ridership and a lack of significant speed increases on the Finch LRT leaves it at a low cost benefit ratio, and that it should be replaced with a BRT. Its essentially spot. BRT can serve customers just as well as LRT, is much cheaper, much more flexible, and can post much higher cost benefit ratios.


905 PROJECTS

The report spends little time on suburban projects, which are largely BRTs. It states that they all make sense and are fine for ridership growth. I contend this, the Davis BRT (though too late to cancel now) gives me serious doubts on its ability to attract new riders, or even serve a somewhat large amount of people.

DRL / GO SUBWAY RELIEF / SUBWAY IMPROVEMENTS

The report recommends complete removal of the DRL line. I DO NOT advocate for this. even if (which it should be) his GO relief is implemented, Bloor Yonge will be overloaded regardless, due to his planned 33% growth in the existing subway system. He doesn't account for this growth, and treats them as separate. The report states that 41,000 people use the Bloor-Danforth line in the east every morning peak. It suggests that with trains every 5-10 minutes departing from the Danforth (which will cost little due to the fact that these trains do not need to be purchased as they are otherwise peak GO trains that sit in a yard all day), it can relieve 5,000 of them from Bloor-Yonge. This is great and honourable and should be implemented, but it still leaves the system at great risk later down the line. The report also advocates for complete automation of the subway system, complete with platform doors and increased frequencies. This is also a great idea, as it will increase capacity by 35% but lower operating costs. It would push Bloor-Yonge to overload once again, with 35% more passengers capable of using the system at peak hours, far offsetting any savings the GO relief had done. (Capacity will increase by about 20,000 people over morning peak, but his preference for the DRL relieves only 5,000 people, meaning up to 15,000 more people will be using Bloor-Yonge in the peak period alone. He also discounts the DRL and gives it a relatively low benefit score (noticeably higher than some suburban schemes, which he had little qualms over) due to its lack of ability to attract new riders. The report seems to be unable to realizethat the DRL is and has never been meant to attract new riders but rather deal with existing ones. The report also inaccurately assumes that Metrolinx is planning to fund all 3 "phases" of the DRL, while in reality it is only planning to fund two, (the two south of Bloor) which leads to unnecessarily low benefit scores as the full line scores worse than the shorter, much less costly version that is currently being planned. another major issue I can forsee with this plan is issues of getting the "relief" trains into Union Station. Union station is already close to its maximum amount of trains in the peak hour, and the report seems to essentially be advocating for a near 50% increase in peak trains departing and arriving at Union.


YONGE SUBWAY EXTENSION

The report states that the yonge subway extension makes sense as long as several stations are removed. (4 of the 6 planned) It states that the remainder can be completed once a developer shows interest of developing around the delayed stations, and is willing to contribute a large sum to pay for it. This could likely occur from day one for Drewry, where a developer is planning a large redevelopment of a suburban shopping plaza. While this improves the cost benefit issue, it fails (as do most things in the report) to account for existing ridership and the fact that the scale of development to make a subway stop viable for a private developer is extremely large, on the scale of Concord Park place and Cityplace. (10+ towers, something that is infeasible on all but a few sites along the line) It also fails to account for existing ridership, which is what (much like the Eglinton Crosstown stops the report requests to remove) these smaller stations would largely serve.

GO ELECTRIFICATION

The report takes another look at how electrification can improve GO service on Lakeshore and possibly Georgetown. The report advocates for EMUs (Electric Multiple Units, trains where each car has a propulsion system, unlike current system where train cars act as dead weight to the locomotive) to be used for 15 minute off peak service, with existing train cars coupled with electric locomotives to deal with peak demand. It argues that EMUs, due to faster acceleration and braking, allow for higher speeds which is required to compete with a car in off peak times, but during the peak period, car travel is less competitive and high speeds aren't as important. Allowing for continued use of existing trainsets also keeps capital costs down, unlike a 100% EMU proposal that GO was previously looking at. This portion of the report seems fairly solid, though it focuses mainly on the Lakeshore corridor and doesn't provide significant information on the other 5 rail lines GO operates. Its possible the best portion for Metrolinx to implement itself.


GENERAL CRITICISM

As I have mentioned several times, the report accounts for new growth only with little to no regard for existing users. The DRL benefits existing users hugely, but the report completely ignore this and advocates for it to be eliminated. It is similar throughout the report, where it advocates for the removal of several stations due to their lack of growth in new riders, despite their significant use for existing ones. It seems to pretend that congestion exists only on roads, and that current transit loads in the city are a happy go lucky affair with little congestion.

The report also states that land use planning needs to be tied to transit planning more often, which is completely true. It then moves on the criticize the Transit City LRTs without barely a mention of how they are deeply tied to land use planning. Other than a couple of "token" inclusions, land use planning is largely ignored by the report.

The report fails to account for local transit, accounting for only regional transportation. This produces serious weak points in the reports plan, with stops on many of the lines being too far apart to truly be feasible.

The report fails to account for the politics behind planning, assuming that political repercussions are non-existent and that politics often plays a different game than the game of rationality.





SUGGESTED IMPLEMENTATION


While this report raises several important criticisms for the Big Move, it also has several flaws. My suggestion would be to take some of the suggestions, and leave many others behind.

What I would suggest Metrolinx implement:

Drop Finch and Sheppard LRTs, supplement with VIVA style BRT systems.

Continue with DRL as planned

Continue with Eglinton Crosstown as planned, possibly with the removal of Chaplin station, though that should undergo a proper review. return to previously planned underground line to Don Mills.

Implement GO electrification, purchase large amounts of DMU (Diesel Multiple Units, what is currently going to be used on the UPX) and EMUs to operate off peak service on all GO lines. 15 minute EMU service on Lakeshore and Kitchener, 30 minute DMU service on all other lines. Ensure this service reaches Hamilton. Peak service will operate with a mix of EMU and upgraded existing services to deal with increased demand. Express services would be served by existing coaches, with the collector routes that stop at all stations being served by EMUs. Similar style operations should occur on all GO lines, with full scale coaches offering express services and DMUs offer the collector runs. (for example, an Express train on Stouffville would likely start at Lincolnville, stopping at only Stouffville, Mount Joy, Centennial, and Unionville, with all other stations being served by the DMUs)

Continue with Scarborough Subway, but only due to political repercussions of a plan switch.

continue as planned with suburban BRT and LRT plans.
 
Here, warning that it is a large PDF:

http://www.neptis.org/sites/default/files/metrolinx_review_2013/review_of_metrolinxs_big_move_neptis_foundation_schabas.pdf


Couple of key criticisms with it: it accounts for new riders only, and does not properly weigh service improvements for existing customers. It focuses on regional transit more than on local transit, often advocating for the removal of several stops on lines. He also seems to disregard existing political enviroments, and how deeply politicized transit planning is.

The report does acknowledge the improvements for existing customers. It points out that it could be better. The bigger picture which is to reduce gridlock is to take people off their cars. Although the local lines (Transit City) achieve their objectives of improving transit for existing customers, it does very little to fix gridlock and to improve the integration with regional transit.

Their solutions effectively would do way better at reducing gridlock and yes even at the cost of cutting a few stops. If a driver feels that he can get to his destination faster by car, he will keep driving. Period. To get him out of his car, you have to get him to his destination faster.
 
They are really tearing Transit City apart...especially how the reports to justify Transit City had poor methodology, incomplete data and flawed conclusions...border line bias.

Methodology

Although the schemes together will cost billions of dollars, and contracts are already being signed, there seems to have been very little evaluation of the economic or financial impacts. TTC staff produced an 18-page report, really just a memorandum,63 called “Evaluation and Comparison of Routes,” which simply lists the proposed schemes, giving their length, capital cost, and annual ridership. There is no mention of alternative routes or modes. There is no estimate of economic benefits. There is no information about operating costs or revenues. While the report breaks riders down into “Existing” and “New – Projected 2021” it is not clear whether these number represent riders that are new because of the scheme, or merely underlying growth; probably they include a bit of both. Background tables list potential populations and specific traffic generators that will be served, but no information was published on whether the impact would be worth the costs.


Methodology

The Transit City schemes attracted political support very quickly, and Metrolinx included them in The Big
Move. Four of Metrolinx’s “Big 5” schemes are in fact Transit City schemes.65 Transit City materials are liberally illustrated with photographs of trams running on tree-lined avenues. But they are short on hard facts and figures about cost, ridership and benefits.


Eglinton Crosstown Ridership

There are some inconsistencies in the data presented in the Eglinton Crosstown BCA. Ridership seems to be very high: about 350,000 per day and more than double the TTC forecast and three times existing bus ridership. Yet incremental revenues are very small, implying less than 10,000 new riders per day. Operating costs seem optimistic; the figures suggest that savings from operating fewer bus-km would not only entirely offset all costs of operating the LRT, but also provide a substantial surplus.


Eglinton Crosstown cost

Although LRT is often proposed as a way to offer the service speed of a subway, at the cost of a streetcar, the infrastructure costs are still substantial and in some cases not much less than for a full subway.


Transit City cost ratio

According to Metrolinx’s own Benefit Case Analyses, these schemes are not worthwhile, at least as transport investments. The Benefit:Cost ratios are all less than 1.0 and some are less than 0.5, indicating that costs are more than double the estimated benefits. Cost per new transit rider is high: $40,000 or more. At this rate, Metrolinx would need $50 billion to achieve its 2033 ridership objectives, not the $36 billion it
is currently trying to raise.


Transit City purpose

The Transit City schemes seem to have been developed more to achieve an urban design vision than to improve transportation in Toronto. The TTC’s original “Transit City” report of 2007 describes the scheme as supporting “city-building,” and includes pictures of LRT systems in attractive, mostly European environments. At about the same time, the city was developing its “Avenues” program, attempting to create a more pedestrian- and bicycle-friendly environment along urban and suburban arterials.[/B]


Sheppard Subway conversion

TTC looked at converting the Sheppard Subway to LRT technology, but the cost to rebuild the stations for low-floor cars would have been about $600 million.


How can Transit City be improved?

1-Neither Metrolinx nor TTC seems to have given serious consideration to development of Scarborough and Eglinton Crosstown lines using ALRT or similar “light metro” technology. This technology has been applied very successfully in more than 20 cities around the world. Some architects and urban designers prefer surface LRT, because it is less visually intrusive, and can run in mixed traffic and pedestrian environments, albeit at much lower speeds. But faster services on exclusive rights-of-way are far more effective, and efficient, at getting motorists to switch to transit.

2-The Toronto LRT schemes could be greatly improved by building them with fully exclusive rights of way, perhaps automated ALRT or similarly technology. Ridership would be much higher, as would the benefits to the region. And the costs could actually be less.

3-Metrolinx could begin by negotiating with Bombardier to supply ALRT cars, as are being built for Vancouver, in place of the 182 Flexity Freedom low-floor LRT cars. To the best of our knowledge, Bombardier has not actually started building these cars. Currently it is building the Flexity Outlook cars for Toronto’s streetcar lines. The first Flexity Freedom is not due to be delivered for at least three years. ALRT cars are smaller than Flexity cars, but also cheaper. Metrolinx should be able to order at least 182 ALRT cars from Bombardier, for the same price. Toronto is a key customer of Bombardier and, although the negotiation may not be easy, Metrolinx should be able to get a reasonable deal.

4-If Bombardier refuses to negotiate a change to ALRT technology at a reasonable price, Metrolinx should be
prepared to cancel the contract and invite new competitive bids, even if it means paying substantial cancellation penalties. There is no point burdening Toronto for the next century with the wrong system.


Ways to improve the Eglinton Crosstown scheme

1.Reduce the number of intermediate stations, to reduce capital and operating costs, offer faster journey times that will attract more new riders, and reduce disruption in surrounding communities. There should be a maximum of 10 stations on the 11-km underground section. The Avenue Road, Chaplin, and Oakwood stations could be omitted. Laird Drive station can be deferred, and built if and when a developer makes a substantial capital contribution to the station. Capital cost savings would be about $600 million, with a further savings of $1 million per year O&M costs per station.

2. Use high-floor cars with a top speed of 100km/h, such as the ALRT Mark 3 being supplied to Vancouver, instead of the 80 km/h low-floor cars TTC has specified. Besides saving staff costs, the higher speeds and faster journey will attract additional riders. Note that, as on the subway and existing RT, high-floor ALRT cars stop at high platform stations and will therefore be fully accessible.

3. Grade-separate the entire line, so trains will not affect road traffic and will offer faster journeys for transit riders. East of Laird Drive and west of Weston Road, Eglinton is a wide street with plenty of space to build an elevated line without harming the environment. This would add about $800 million to project costs, or perhaps $100 million per km, compared with the surface line that is currently planned. Road traffic disruption will be greatly reduced and there will be little or no permanent loss of road space.

4. Automate the trains. With an entirely grade-separated line, trains can be automated, with large
operating cost savings
and the ability to offer more frequent off-peak services.

5.Build shorter platforms to reduce station costs. Current plans show 150-metre platforms, similar to the subway. Savings of about $10 million per underground station, or about $100 million could be captured by building 60-metre platforms, sufficient for all foreseeable traffic.


Consider BRT for Finch West

-At present, there appears to be no reasonable economic case for building the Sheppard East or Finch West LRTs

-In the Environmental Project Report, there is a brief consideration of BRT. The report states LRT is chosen because although “the capital costs of…BRT are lower than for LRT, roughly $10 million per km in contrast to approximately $40 million per km for LRT … ongoing maintenance costs … for LRT is anticipated to be cheaper than BRT.” There is no consideration of whether the maintenance cost difference can offset the large capital cost. By comparison, Mississauga also considered an LRT for the Dundas route, but decided that BRT offered better value for money.
 
Glad to see someone ripping into the flawed Transit City.

Also very glad to see questions being asked around the Eglinton Crosstown... An underground streetcar for the cost of a subway!
 
The complaints of it aren't about it being a "streetcar", its complaints are about it being slow on the surface portions. the report doesn't care about the underground part, as it operates as a subway, its beef is with the surface portion. the reason it suggests a change in vehicle type has more to do with matching the RT than the current type being "a streetcar".
 
The complaints of it aren't about it being a "streetcar", its complaints are about it being slow on the surface portions. the report doesn't care about the underground part, as it operates as a subway, its beef is with the surface portion. the reason it suggests a change in vehicle type has more to do with matching the RT than the current type being "a streetcar".

1) Low floor vehicles costing more than standard subway cars.
2) A larger tunnel diameter costing more than a standard subway tunnel to accomodate a pantograph.

This incredible boondoggle would cost more than a regular subway line. That's what is hilarious about this. You're paying subway prices for essentially what is a streetcar in a tunnel (don't argue, that's what it looks like).
 
DRL / GO SUBWAY RELIEF / SUBWAY IMPROVEMENTS
The report recommends complete removal of the DRL line. I DO NOT advocate for this. even if (which it should be) his GO relief is implemented, Bloor Yonge will be overloaded regardless, due to his planned 33% growth in the existing subway system. He doesn't account for this growth, and treats them as separate. The report states that 41,000 people use the Bloor-Danforth line in the east every morning peak. It suggests that with trains every 5-10 minutes departing from the Danforth (which will cost little due to the fact that these trains do not need to be purchased as they are otherwise peak GO trains that sit in a yard all day), it can relieve 5,000 of them from Bloor-Yonge. This is great and honourable and should be implemented, but it still leaves the system at great risk later down the line. The report also advocates for complete automation of the subway system, complete with platform doors and increased frequencies. This is also a great idea, as it will increase capacity by 35% but lower operating costs. It would push Bloor-Yonge to overload once again, with 35% more passengers capable of using the system at peak hours, far offsetting any savings the GO relief had done. (Capacity will increase by about 20,000 people over morning peak, but his preference for the DRL relieves only 5,000 people, meaning up to 15,000 more people will be using Bloor-Yonge in the peak period alone. He also discounts the DRL and gives it a relatively low benefit score (noticeably higher than some suburban schemes, which he had little qualms over) due to its lack of ability to attract new riders. The report seems to be unable to realizethat the DRL is and has never been meant to attract new riders but rather deal with existing ones. The report also inaccurately assumes that Metrolinx is planning to fund all 3 "phases" of the DRL, while in reality it is only planning to fund two, (the two south of Bloor) which leads to unnecessarily low benefit scores as the full line scores worse than the shorter, much less costly version that is currently being planned. another major issue I can forsee with this plan is issues of getting the "relief" trains into Union Station. Union station is already close to its maximum amount of trains in the peak hour, and the report seems to essentially be advocating for a near 50% increase in peak trains departing and arriving at Union.
Nicely said. I hope you don't mind, but I've added your thoughts to this topic on the DRL Facebook group (link below).
 
It would have been interesting if the entire Eglinton Crosstown LRT were elevated. There are no historic vistas along the entire route.
 
SUGGESTED IMPLEMENTATION


What I would suggest Metrolinx implement:

Drop Finch and Sheppard LRTs, supplement with VIVA style BRT systems.

Continue with Eglinton Crosstown as planned, possibly with the removal of Chaplin station, though that should undergo a proper review. return to previously planned underground line to Don Mills.

How about the savings from cancelling both Finch and Sheppard LRT goes to elevating Eglinton East? They estimate the upgrade at 800M$.
 
Pay for the Scarborough Wye. the report recommends a 20% lower capital expenditure remember, though this does include cancelling the $7 billion DRL.
 
Like I said in the other thread, the report seems to believe that the Crosstown's only function is to be a substitute for the 401 which is where my criticism lies.

Implementing the report's suggestions for reducing stations at Laird, Chaplin, Avenue and Oakwood eliminates many local destinations for people living in Midtown rendering the Crosstown as only an alternative to the current buses as a means to reach the YUS line. It is antithetical to how Midtown Toronto envisions itself and how this part of the city is currently developing. We are not a suburb.

Maybe Eglinton should've been something else other than an LRT from the start but that ship has long since sailed. Reducing some stops in Scarborough and elevating that portion of the line are still options worth considering as the contracts for that part of the line hasn't been signed yet. If doing so delays construction and opening of the eastern portion after Laird, it isn't the worst scenario. Laird will be short-turn capable anyway. I am not against the idea of having the private sector pay for some stations in the underground portion (Chaplin, Avenue, Oakwood) but I'm worried about the feasibility of doing this now. Digging of the Midtown portion has already begun.
 
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Implementing the report's suggestions for reducing stations at Laird, Chaplin, Avenue and Oakwood eliminates many local destinations for people living in Midtown rendering the Crosstown as only an alternative to the current buses as a means to reach the YUS line. It is antithetical to how Midtown Toronto envisions itself and how this part of the city is currently developing. We are not a suburb.

As someone living near Avenue and Eglinton, I'm completely on board with getting rid of Avenue road.

It would be quicker for me to take the 61A to Yonge-Eg and transfer there as opposed to transferring at Avenue road then again at Yonge and Eglinton, even assuming the bus really crawls along Eglinton.

Local demand at Avenue n Egliton hardly comes close to justifying a station.

Really, if there's any cardinal rule of transit planning in this city it's that rapid transit should never justify itself based on local demand. No amount of preexisting density or TOD will be able to justify rapid transit. Route layout should basically focus on connecting surface routes.
 
And what do we do with The $1.2 Billion we'll have left?

1a-Build Finch BRT From Neilson Road (Malvern Town Centre) to Humber college
around 32 Km

1b-Create a Pearson Terminal 1 & 3 Branch on the BRT route

2-Cancellation fee for both Finch and Sheppard LRT

3-Sheppard BRT From Don Mills to Morningside
 

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