Everyone talks about inflation as the reason the project has ballooned, but what exactly is causing the increase? Is it labor? materials? engineering? Or was scope changed? How do we make sure the next time a project doesn't get completely changed from proposal to construction.
I don't know a ton about the nuts-and-bolts of construction, but I thought I'd have a look at this anyway. There's a detailed building price index available, which tracks the overall cost of residential and nonresidential building construction; the nonresidential is a mix of office, factory, warehouse, shopping centre, school and bus depot -- but the more detailed, I suspect the less reliable it is. Here's the nonresidential price index for Calgary by building component:

1722485408254.png

Note that it's an index where 2017 is 100, so the overall cost of nonresidential buildings has an index of 129; i.e. prices have gone up 29% since 2017. An LRT line is not a building, although it uses a lot of the same materials and trades; but like less plumbing and more earthwork than a typical building. The big component with really high cost increases are in metals and wood; a lot of the next ones, like openings, finishes and plumbing are not going to have a ton of use in an LRT system, I think.

Here's a few key dimensions over time, with the overall composite nonresidential building as a thick dashed line, (which will be the same line in all of the next figures so it's a useful reference):
1722486553049.png

Metal work had a spike in mid 2018, but otherwise, everything was quite flat price-wise until 2021, when the prices really started spiking; some have levelled off, and some still seem to be increasing.

Digging in a little bit more, there is also an industrial product price index, which breaks down the cost of a wide range of specific products at the national level. Here's the price of a few products that might be useful to buy if you're building an LRT line. (Note that the index in the link uses 2020 as a reference, and I've rebased it to have 2017 as the base, so it can be plotted along with the nonresidential building construction price index).

1722486497409.png


Some of these are really massive price increases; metal products almost doubled in price, with almost all of that increase in 2021. Heavy equipment and rolling stock went up less than construction as a whole, but in general it seems like materials went up faster than their underlying construction costs.

Which leaves labour as another key element; I don't think it'll surprise people what happened to labour if materials went up faster than construction overall. I've got two sources here; one is the union construction wage for Calgary, and one is average weekly earnings in Alberta by industry. Note that these are not identical measures -- you can increase someone's wage and cut their hours, or keep their wage flat but give them overtime to increase their earnings. You can also have someone more productive make more output for the same earnings. Not to mention that plenty of construction workers are non-union (especially in terms of 'construction industry workers', which includes the office staff at construction companies, managers, etc.) Note that the union wage numbers are only updated twice a year.
1722487017993.png

The actual union wages were pretty flat until 2023; while earnings more generally rose about 20% pretty steadily, but the all get to the same ballpark in the end. In any case, these are going up at a lower rate than construction in general.

Note this is a period of pretty substantial consumer price increases: here are the union wages (in actual dollars), both in current dollars (i.e. what the pay stub will say) and in constant 2017 dollars (i.e. how much they can buy relative to 2017 after inflation), showing the reduced buying power because of inflation:
1722487267206.png

On paper, these workers saw their wages go up by 20% or so since 2017, mostly in the past year. At the checkout, they can afford about 92-94% of what they could 7 1/2 years ago, and the recent wage bumps only take them back to mid-2021 purchasing power.

All this of course doesn't include other potential inflation factors (land acquisition -- house prices have shot up; financing costs -- interest also spiked), as well as likely the other culprits of scope creep, mispricing risk because of the design-build contract structure, etc, etc, etc.

How many billion would have been saved had the UCP and Rick McIver not put funding on hold for 2 years during COVID when we were still the only major project of this kind in NA? And all to review it and find nothing worth changing. And now they will point out this insufficient, butchered Phase 1 and say: “see! It wasn’t worth doing.”
No matter what you look at, the UCP put the hold on it starting December 2020... if I could time market spikes like that, I'd be too rich to bother posting here. (Just kidding, I'd post more, but with even fancier graphs... maybe Dijon graphs.)
 

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Well… wow. I missed some news. This is f*cked up. $6.2 billion for 7 stations, none of which are near densely populated areas? They even nixed Centre Street South Station, and that had the largest population within walking distance of it. Good lord what a shit show. I’ve lost faith now. Edmonton can do a major project and Calgary can’t?


feelings-i-am.gif
Less for more: the City has a lot to answer for. Poor management and planning for the design and estimate phase. Bold of the City to announce a new value without a full design in place!
 
I don't know a ton about the nuts-and-bolts of construction, but I thought I'd have a look at this anyway. There's a detailed building price index available, which tracks the overall cost of residential and nonresidential building construction; the nonresidential is a mix of office, factory, warehouse, shopping centre, school and bus depot -- but the more detailed, I suspect the less reliable it is. Here's the nonresidential price index for Calgary by building component:

View attachment 585028
Note that it's an index where 2017 is 100, so the overall cost of nonresidential buildings has an index of 129; i.e. prices have gone up 29% since 2017. An LRT line is not a building, although it uses a lot of the same materials and trades; but like less plumbing and more earthwork than a typical building. The big component with really high cost increases are in metals and wood; a lot of the next ones, like openings, finishes and plumbing are not going to have a ton of use in an LRT system, I think.

Here's a few key dimensions over time, with the overall composite nonresidential building as a thick dashed line, (which will be the same line in all of the next figures so it's a useful reference):
View attachment 585038
Metal work had a spike in mid 2018, but otherwise, everything was quite flat price-wise until 2021, when the prices really started spiking; some have levelled off, and some still seem to be increasing.

Digging in a little bit more, there is also an industrial product price index, which breaks down the cost of a wide range of specific products at the national level. Here's the price of a few products that might be useful to buy if you're building an LRT line. (Note that the index in the link uses 2020 as a reference, and I've rebased it to have 2017 as the base, so it can be plotted along with the nonresidential building construction price index).

View attachment 585037

Some of these are really massive price increases; metal products almost doubled in price, with almost all of that increase in 2021. Heavy equipment and rolling stock went up less than construction as a whole, but in general it seems like materials went up faster than their underlying construction costs.

Which leaves labour as another key element; I don't think it'll surprise people what happened to labour if materials went up faster than construction overall. I've got two sources here; one is the union construction wage for Calgary, and one is average weekly earnings in Alberta by industry. Note that these are not identical measures -- you can increase someone's wage and cut their hours, or keep their wage flat but give them overtime to increase their earnings. You can also have someone more productive make more output for the same earnings. Not to mention that plenty of construction workers are non-union (especially in terms of 'construction industry workers', which includes the office staff at construction companies, managers, etc.) Note that the union wage numbers are only updated twice a year.
View attachment 585040
The actual union wages were pretty flat until 2023; while earnings more generally rose about 20% pretty steadily, but the all get to the same ballpark in the end. In any case, these are going up at a lower rate than construction in general.

Note this is a period of pretty substantial consumer price increases: here are the union wages (in actual dollars), both in current dollars (i.e. what the pay stub will say) and in constant 2017 dollars (i.e. how much they can buy relative to 2017 after inflation), showing the reduced buying power because of inflation:
View attachment 585041
On paper, these workers saw their wages go up by 20% or so since 2017, mostly in the past year. At the checkout, they can afford about 92-94% of what they could 7 1/2 years ago, and the recent wage bumps only take them back to mid-2021 purchasing power.

All this of course doesn't include other potential inflation factors (land acquisition -- house prices have shot up; financing costs -- interest also spiked), as well as likely the other culprits of scope creep, mispricing risk because of the design-build contract structure, etc, etc, etc.


No matter what you look at, the UCP put the hold on it starting December 2020... if I could time market spikes like that, I'd be too rich to bother posting here. (Just kidding, I'd post more, but with even fancier graphs... maybe Dijon graphs.)
You are using the wrong index. Google civil or industrial engineering pricing. Find railroads and you will get answers. Using a risk reward contract is asking for trouble in getting a firmer price. Who is cost controlling this?
 
You are using the wrong index. Google civil or industrial engineering pricing. Find railroads and you will get answers. Using a risk reward contract is asking for trouble in getting a firmer price. Who is cost controlling this?
I'm just going to comment on the strange fact that you created this account recently just to post these kinds of cryptic messages of outrage and opposition. You've posted like 10 times in this thread to say basically the same thing.
 
Look at all these new posters coming out of the woodwork to defend the province and exclusively blame the city. Sure there’s blame to go around but objectively the province delaying the project in 2020 resulted in the price skyrocketing.
Tbh that the city didn’t realize it wasn’t ready was a real problem and showed poor project leadership.

Lots of whipsaw trying to find a technical solution that just wasn’t there to control costs and mitigate geology.
 
Tbh that the city didn’t realize it wasn’t ready was a real problem and showed poor project leadership.

Lots of whipsaw trying to find a technical solution that just wasn’t there to control costs and mitigate geology.
This is the most damning thing for me. The initial costing and readiness were just so unbelievably wrong. It would be nice to see an inquiry or academic study to find out why that happened, and why it took so long to realize it (though it still seems nobody is really acknowledging it).

It kinda seems like anybody who did realize it ran into a brick wall and/or abandoned ship
 
T
This is the most damning thing for me. The initial costing and readiness were just so unbelievably wrong. It would be nice to see an inquiry or academic study to find out why that happened, and why it took so long to realize it (though it still seems nobody is really acknowledging it).

It kinda seems like anybody who did realize it ran into a brick wall and/or abandoned ship
The Greenline and the Event Centre 1.0 were two sides of the same coin. Decisions made early without evaluation then presented big problems which weren't reexamined, instead, direction from council, whether from motion, or as expressed preference during Q&A, or from a councillor directly leading a process, was treated as sacrosanct. Extreme preference to not go back to council for redirection slows everything down. For the event centre, we saw how much better the result was when the footprint was allowed to grow, and the target number of seats was allowed to shrink which were both against Council preference.

For the Greenline, we never had that, because even during this last project phase, the expressed preference from a Q&A from iirc 2017 was stuck to. That preference is so strong, that even cutting most of the distance was preferable. But we never saw the tradeoff in public. I'm not confident an evaluation was ever made.

Imagine what it would be like being a career official in that environment. You don't get truth to power when council can define not giving answers they want as being difficult and have you shuffled off with little difficulty.

Its one reason project boards are in best practice brought in very early for projects that aren't typical, and stood up with a CEO that is compensated appropriately for the magnitude of the project. The board insulates the CEO from being fired, and the CEO can speak truth to power. The board forces the council to define their objectives early, and then works to meet those objectives, and shields the project from changes outside of those objectives. Having the objectives defined, lets the CEO respond to most requests with either: this does not serve the objective, do you want to redefine the objective? or, this is out of scope with the objective, perhaps this could be pursued through other means.
 
T

The Greenline and the Event Centre 1.0 were two sides of the same coin. Decisions made early without evaluation then presented big problems which weren't reexamined, instead, direction from council, whether from motion, or as expressed preference during Q&A, or from a councillor directly leading a process, was treated as sacrosanct. Extreme preference to not go back to council for redirection slows everything down. For the event centre, we saw how much better the result was when the footprint was allowed to grow, and the target number of seats was allowed to shrink which were both against Council preference.

For the Greenline, we never had that, because even during this last project phase, the expressed preference from a Q&A from iirc 2017 was stuck to. That preference is so strong, that even cutting most of the distance was preferable. But we never saw the tradeoff in public. I'm not confident an evaluation was ever made.

Imagine what it would be like being a career official in that environment. You don't get truth to power when council can define not giving answers they want as being difficult and have you shuffled off with little difficulty.

Its one reason project boards are in best practice brought in very early for projects that aren't typical, and stood up with a CEO that is compensated appropriately for the magnitude of the project. The board insulates the CEO from being fired, and the CEO can speak truth to power. The board forces the council to define their objectives early, and then works to meet those objectives, and shields the project from changes outside of those objectives. Having the objectives defined, lets the CEO respond to most requests with either: this does not serve the objective, do you want to redefine the objective? or, this is out of scope with the objective, perhaps this could be pursued through other means.
Do some literature research on megaprojects. A complicated process with several unique, distinct phases. Expect surprises. Calgary will learn with difficulty how sincere promises can fade away quickly.
 
Do some literature research on megaprojects. A complicated process with several unique, distinct phases. Expect surprises. Calgary will learn with difficulty how sincere promises can fade away quickly.
Very aware of the Flyvbjerg hypothesis. Very aware of how it is also abused by the do nothing ever faction (except for things they want, which mysteriously become not megaprojects). Very aware of how in Calgary we only started hearing about it after the above ground section east of the elbow was merged into one contract with the tunnel to follow international best practice, with likely meant local contractors were no longer big enough to be prime contractors and instead needed to get contracts under larger consortium partners, reducing their potential profits.

The city is very much at fault for a lot of the failings here. But Flyvbjerg imo alone provides a useful overview of the problems with projects, and doesn't provide solutions beyond not doing anything ever.
 
That's fair, I can only speak to the fact that I live near one of the stations that was cut... I was contemplating taking the train downtown once built, but if I'm driving up Ogden Road (literally my commute today) I'm just going to keep going driving downtown. Everyone's different though. 🤷‍♂️
Is cost at all a factor? Do you need to pay for parking downtown? Do you find yourself stuck in traffic often on that route?

If the actual traffic isn't much of an issue where this line serves than it is vital to add on to this ASAP. I think you need to get Justin's crew to commit to something before they're gone. I do not see Pierre scuttling the commitment to building a train out to Conservative voters in the SE.
 
I do wish they'd found the money, somehow, to get the line built to Quarry Park. Not sure what the extra cost would be, but with the amount of employment and new residential going in there it seems like having a station would generate a lot more ridership. I also worry that some of the development planned for there may not go ahead now.
 
Very aware of the Flyvbjerg hypothesis. Very aware of how it is also abused by the do nothing ever faction (except for things they want, which mysteriously become not megaprojects). Very aware of how in Calgary we only started hearing about it after the above ground section east of the elbow was merged into one contract with the tunnel to follow international best practice, with likely meant local contractors were no longer big enough to be prime contractors and instead needed to get contracts under larger consortium partners, reducing their potential profits.

The city is very much at fault for a lot of the failings here. But Flyvbjerg imo alone provides a useful overview of the problems with projects, and doesn't provide solutions beyond not doing anything ever.
Flyvbjerg does not provide solutions for the problems. His hypothesis concentrates on areas where control and emphasis should be strong. Too many cooks?
 

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