I've added a poll to the thread with three basic options. If there's another option that would make a good choice let me know and I'll add it.
- Thread starter Surrealplaces
- Start date
outoftheice
Active Member
The Premier had finally put to bed speculation that the UCP will block the revised Stage 1 from going forward. Assuming the Feds give the thumbs up this week, hopefully we can finally start talking about what happens next for not just Green Line but for transit investment in Calgary instead of relitigating 10 years of debates
calgaryherald.com
Bell: Danielle Smith stiffs a Green Line rethink and folks are angry
Premier Danielle Smith has spoken out against Calgary's Green Line plan but will not push for a rethink of it despite her support for one
calgaryherald.com
lemongrab
Active Member
From the sprawl article
I understand the timeline challenges, but I don't accept the reasoning to "respect" prior work that has proven to be so substantially wrong over and over again. An absolutely critical decision was to commit to connecting the lines (thereby necessitating this whole notion of 'build the difficult part first'). That decision was based on costs that were orders of magnitude incorrect, and benefits that will be realized decades later than supposed at that time. If that isn't reason to reconsider a fundamental decision, I don't know what is!
I'd feel a lot better if they could honestly come out and say something like "we did explore some dramatic alternatives, but for various reasons this remains the best path". I probably wouldn't agree with that conclusion, but I'd appreciate that they have a lot more info than I do and are not simply burying their heads in the sand.
The funding partner challenge has been long evident (though I think the risk of delivering a white elephant isn't being properly factored) , but the procurement risk is a totally fair point that I had not really considered. I'm not sure its enough to excuse the sunk cost fallacy at play here, and I worry we are anchoring ourselves in the other direction.
Is it worse to be a noncommittal client who may balk if the costs are too great, or a client who will plow onward no matter how bad the cost vs benefit becomes?
This speaks to my recent rant, but the objective seems quite clearly to build the Green Line...not necessarily to deliver the best possible transit.
I understand the timeline challenges, but I don't accept the reasoning to "respect" prior work that has proven to be so substantially wrong over and over again. An absolutely critical decision was to commit to connecting the lines (thereby necessitating this whole notion of 'build the difficult part first'). That decision was based on costs that were orders of magnitude incorrect, and benefits that will be realized decades later than supposed at that time. If that isn't reason to reconsider a fundamental decision, I don't know what is!
I'd feel a lot better if they could honestly come out and say something like "we did explore some dramatic alternatives, but for various reasons this remains the best path". I probably wouldn't agree with that conclusion, but I'd appreciate that they have a lot more info than I do and are not simply burying their heads in the sand.
The funding partner challenge has been long evident (though I think the risk of delivering a white elephant isn't being properly factored) , but the procurement risk is a totally fair point that I had not really considered. I'm not sure its enough to excuse the sunk cost fallacy at play here, and I worry we are anchoring ourselves in the other direction.
Is it worse to be a noncommittal client who may balk if the costs are too great, or a client who will plow onward no matter how bad the cost vs benefit becomes?
outoftheice
Active Member
In this case it is definitely worse to be a non-commital owner. Bhatti has said publicly before at Green Line Board meetings that their traffic light risk model went from a yellow light to a red light when they started looking at costing from local subcontractors who were unexpectedly pricing major risk premiums into their quotes due to the perceived political uncertainty around the project.
The Green Line team even went as far as trying to create incentives for non local subs to participate in the project to lower cost but it's a small industry and word travels quickly about risk and there are a lot of infrastructure dollars flowing into other cities as well, keeping those companies busy.
If the City of Calgary stopped procurement and had to go back to the market a third time, guaranteed they would receive costing from a market that had already been twice burned that would have off the charts risk premium pricing that would probably make any future iteration of a Green Line Stage 1 completely unfeasable to build.
zenkz
New Member
I see two more quite reasonable options:
1. Go at-ground in Downtown with transit-priority signals (most likely with slightly altered route - for example 3rd ave SW instead of the 2nd and a short tunnel or overpass between CP mainline and 6th ave SW). Later can be replaced with a tunnel with reusing the at-ground line for a different LRT project.
2. Build a line from Seton - Shepard and then along Deerfoot and Anderson road to Anderson station of the red line. Then build the extension to downtown and convert the spur between Shepard and Anderson to a separate connector line with a possible extension further west. (This options adds LRT where it is needed most)
Ramsayite
Active Member
This is "redesign the whole system" and quite honestly, I think this sort of thing is just likely to cause substantially more delays, costs, and no green line.
The answer to me is clear. The cost of the line has escalated. We pay the escalated cost just like we were willing to do (?) for the arena. That starts with paying for the core section..then let's fund another $6b and get the whole thing done.
lemongrab
Active Member
Are we not already demonstrating our inability to commit by cutting this scope in half? Presumably a lot of flexibility was built into the procurement process, but for most vendors we are only moving forward on about half of what we went to market for. We kinda look like idiots either way.
The alternative scenario of going to SEBRT and pivoting focus to NLRT means:
- Earthworks, bridges, utilities, etc continue as planned
- rolling stock, tracks, and signals delayed (most of these being the latest deliverables years from now)
- tunnels pretty much cancelled
- continue Shephard MSF; figure out Aurora MSF instead of the Highfield thing now
It's just a different way to de-scope, and the reputational harm would be more limited to non-local specialists. A lot of the design work stays the same - its good that it's been done with the intent of LRT.
I guess I'm not sure how different it would really be to go to market 'again' for NLRT than it will be to go back to market 'again' for extensions off this stub.
darwink
Senior Member
Its all about the tunnel. They've been consulting informally and formally about the tunnel for 8 years. The tunnel builders are few, and have a lot of business going on, even in Canada. 3 projects simultaneously boring in Toronto, one in Vancouver, one in Montreal. There isn't a lack of work.
IMO, if we had pulled the trigger on single bore massive tunnel with a full 6 underground stations for all of the beltline to 16th in 2017, it would have been cheaper, even with overruns, than the 1.5 (and 1 roughed in) underground stations covering half the distance we get today.
By trying to optimize the problem and reduce risk we instead ruined it.
Now, if we had started that big tunnel it in 2017, I bet a contract for $1.8 billion or so would have been signed, and in 2022-23 there would have been a cash call for another $500mm-$1 billion.
In that situation we would feel we had made a mistake even if in actuality delaying (what we did do) was the mistake all along.
We traded a bit more certainty and a tiny bit of less risk for 7 years and a billion dollars. It was NOT worth it.
IMO, if we had pulled the trigger on single bore massive tunnel with a full 6 underground stations for all of the beltline to 16th in 2017, it would have been cheaper, even with overruns, than the 1.5 (and 1 roughed in) underground stations covering half the distance we get today.
By trying to optimize the problem and reduce risk we instead ruined it.
Now, if we had started that big tunnel it in 2017, I bet a contract for $1.8 billion or so would have been signed, and in 2022-23 there would have been a cash call for another $500mm-$1 billion.
In that situation we would feel we had made a mistake even if in actuality delaying (what we did do) was the mistake all along.
We traded a bit more certainty and a tiny bit of less risk for 7 years and a billion dollars. It was NOT worth it.
accord1999
Active Member
Was it actually possible to make that decision in 2017? Paul Giannelia wasn't hired until March 2018 and at his first appearance at Council, he had a timeline of Q1 2019 for the RFP.
And even in October 2018, a presentation he made to the Transport/Transit committee noted that they were still deciding on a dual-bore versus single-bore tunnel.
But then he left a month later, I've always been curious as to why and how that set the Green Line back.
darwink
Senior Member
That is the thing really, still deciding. But in June 2017, the Transportation and Transit Committee approved the final alignment. Before that approval, it was clear, due to pushback from BOMA, that downtown would be underground. Due to pushback from the Stampede, the Beltline would be as well. At a meeting I remember to be contemporaneous, perhaps the very same meeting, the contracting got off track when Council started listening to local industry and talking about breaking the project into little chunks so different contractors could bid on different bits.
Council believed it could have everything, a fixed cost project, broken up into bite sized contracts, that was underground.
With that mandate, administration attempted to deliver the contract, and could never get all those things aligned, so spun their wheels until 2020/1 iirc when the Green Line Board was appointed.
This from a Herald article is great: "Giannelia’s repeated emphasis on cost control wasn’t always well received by councillors looking for broader details on station design and the Green Line’s impact on surrounding neighbourhoods."
Gondek's response was "Everything is about cost-per-kilometre but it’s not about ridership and modal progression, and it tends to be buried in page seven of whatever report we’re getting. While I respect and appreciate everything has to be done in a cost-effective manner, I am not seeing attention to very important considerations."
darwink
Senior Member
In Q2 of 2017, they thought they were at a Class "D" estimate. They had top of rail and alignment for the entire project. Council started fooling around with the alignment immediately, a recommendation for further investigation and the project team didn't push back! On top of it all, their procurement strategy was leisurely at best. With the benefit of hindsight the signs of an out of control project were there even then.
InfrastructureEnthusiast
New Member
Well put me down for a rethink vote. Three fairly major problems with the current vision come to mind.
1. The surface on center st choice was the biggest fault. A crosstown line of this magnitude should have been designed to at least be ALRT capable, even if not automated right away.
2. Without a forced unneeded streetcar type portion, there's no need for low floor. That doesn't mean every station has to be a huge expensive crowfoot style monster, I suspect a Sunnyside scale station would work fine in many cases.
3. I also suspect commuting patterns weren't reexamined after covid to see what leg was most needed. Even before, iirc the north leg had more expected users, but the maintenance yard 'needed' the SE leg to be done first or simultaneously. Lack of creative thinking there.
It's clear that Calgary isn't equipped to do any major tunnel work, even the planning and alignment seems to be a stretch.. I think it would be worth putting out an international RFI for Both a green line and red line tunnel megaproject.
A savvy provincial gov might even be able to broker an energy for construction deal with an Asian partner with a lot of metro construction experience...
Hoping to get a look at what Japan has been building in Saigon soon, maybe council should take a fact/pho finding trip!
1. The surface on center st choice was the biggest fault. A crosstown line of this magnitude should have been designed to at least be ALRT capable, even if not automated right away.
2. Without a forced unneeded streetcar type portion, there's no need for low floor. That doesn't mean every station has to be a huge expensive crowfoot style monster, I suspect a Sunnyside scale station would work fine in many cases.
3. I also suspect commuting patterns weren't reexamined after covid to see what leg was most needed. Even before, iirc the north leg had more expected users, but the maintenance yard 'needed' the SE leg to be done first or simultaneously. Lack of creative thinking there.
It's clear that Calgary isn't equipped to do any major tunnel work, even the planning and alignment seems to be a stretch.. I think it would be worth putting out an international RFI for Both a green line and red line tunnel megaproject.
A savvy provincial gov might even be able to broker an energy for construction deal with an Asian partner with a lot of metro construction experience...
Hoping to get a look at what Japan has been building in Saigon soon, maybe council should take a fact/pho finding trip!
Bad news: they already bought a bunch of low floor trains.
InfrastructureEnthusiast
New Member
What, seriously? They bought trains before they even had track laid??
Council must have gotten one hell of a steak diner from the bombardier people...
Well, I suppose they could always sell them to Edmonton? It's only a matter of time before they lose a few to collisions at their grade crossings.
Council must have gotten one hell of a steak diner from the bombardier people...
Well, I suppose they could always sell them to Edmonton? It's only a matter of time before they lose a few to collisions at their grade crossings.
CBBarnett
Senior Member
Trains take a long time to procure, just like building the tracks. Also it wasn't Bombardier (who no longer build trains, only business jets since about 10 years ago) it was CAF, a large spanish train manufacturer. Like any contract, I am sure there's a cancellation clause if you decide to not want the trains anymore.
We had years of the low-floor/high-floor debate, and now it almost seems like a red herring - either could work just fine, but wasting a bunch of time debating the pros/cons cost so much more than the difference between either option.