[nfitz]

Just one small clarification: the article quotes Weir saying it was a HBD not Verster.

How long does it take out of curiosity to transfer on radio between the Metrolinx territory and the CN territory?

If there really was 6 minutes between the request and the collision, then how many signals were passed? I don't know the area in particular, but surely there are frequent signals in that area. Wouldn't that stop the train even if there problems communicating by radio?

The reported January incident is even more damning. Police and another GO officer were already on the tracks, and a request by police to stop trains was ignored? And then the Ministry of Labour took no action? Had that near-miss been taken seriously, then this incident could very likely not have happened.

 

[crs1026]

If there really was 6 minutes between the request and the collision, then how many signals were passed? I don't know the area in particular, but surely there are frequent signals in that area. Wouldn't that stop the train even if there problems communicating by radio?

The route may have been lined ahead for some distance, if so the signals would already indicate "proceed". It is possible for the RTC to "drop" the signals (ie return them to stop) in the face of an approaching train, but that act has its own risks and generates paperwork. Normally the RTC would contact the train before doing that.... and if they can contact the train, they don't need to drop the signals as they can simply instruct the train verbally to stop.

The reported January incident is even more damning. Police and another GO officer were already on the tracks, and a request by police to stop trains was ignored? And then the Ministry of Labour took no action? Had that near-miss been taken seriously, then this incident could very likely not have happened.

Nothing like a chain of jurisdictions and operational dispatchers.

And it's even more challenging to get any number of first responders, GO security, and railway operations all on the same page. Especially since any operating practice would have to be inserted in the railway operating rules (CROR) which GO security and first responders don't apply.

I had an experience a few years back where I had to call in a rollover on the highway. The 911 call taker asked me "Are you a man in a red jacket standing next to a black car on the shoulder?" I looked up and there was a traffic cam. The call taker could see the whole scene. Monitoring railway lines is nowhere that slick - although the use of cameras is growing. At the moment, the whole chain of railway operations works... when everything goes right.

- Paul

 

[nfitz]

The route may have been lined ahead for some distance, if so the signals would already indicate "proceed". It is possible for the RTC to "drop" the signals (ie return them to stop) in the face of an approaching train, but that act has its own risks and generates paperwork. Normally the RTC would contact the train before doing that.... and if they can contact the train, they don't need to drop the signals as they can simply instruct the train verbally to stop.

As a layman, this seems to defeat the point of having signals - which I'd think would a red would override anything that was called into the operator.

On subway platforms, anyone can stop the trains, with the emergency power button. I've not really heard of much abuse of this. I wonder if there needs to be some kind of equivalent for frequent heavy rail.[/quote]

The 911 call taker asked me "Are you a man in a red jacket standing next to a black car on the shoulder?"

On one hand, very reassuring. On the other hand, rather unnerving.

 

[crs1026]

As a layman, this seems to defeat the point of having signals - which I'd think would (at least on red) override anything that was called into the operator.

The railway rules actually operate in the reverse. Any uncertainty or specific act (such as a verbal instruction, or even waving an object violently beside the track) overrides the authority to proceed which the signal had provided.

The issue is that if the crew observes a signal drop to red, they must assume it's one of any number of potential dangers that the signals are designed to detect. Such as washouts, broken rails, (unplanned) entry of another train or cars onto their path, etc. The result is generally to assume the worst and initiate an emergency brake application which may cause damage or injury by itself. At minimum a GO train is at risk of flattening the wheels, or throwing people around....on a longer freight train there may be coupler separations, drawbar damage or in the extreme cars may derail.

And, any time a crew experiences a dropped signal, they must report it and it must be investigated.

In this case - if the train was six minutes away when the problem was reported, there was time to order a controlled stop. Only ML knows how that six minutes was used or wasted.

- Paul

 

[nfitz]

The railway rules actually operate in the reverse. Any uncertainty or specific act (such as a verbal instruction, or even waving an object violently beside the track) overrides the authority to proceed which the signal had provided.

I thought that was my point (which I've now clarified). A red signal would stop the train. Though yes, emergency breaking could create it's own problems (though I'd assume this happened as well, once the operator could see the person on the track).

Still, 5 minutes is a long time. How many signals were passed? Wouldn't a yellow, followed by a red, let the train stop safely, without creating havoc, well before the location? And then follow-up with a call.

 

[crs1026]

I thought that was my point (which I've now clarified). A red signal would stop the train. Though yes, emergency breaking could create it's own problems (though I'd assume this happened as well, once the operator could see the person on the track).

Still, 5 minutes is a long time. How many signals were passed? Wouldn't a yellow, followed by a red, let the train stop safely, without creating havoc, well before the location? And then follow-up with a call.

It all depends on where the train was, and what signals were located where. The RTC can only drop a "home signal" at a control point. The intermediate signals then adjust their indications based on the status of the home signals. So, in a perfect scenario, the train would still be several blocks from the home signal and it could be dropped to red and the intermediates would change their indications to require a controlled deceleration. But in the worst case, the train would already be closing on the home signal and dropping it would trigger a panic stop.
The RTC's console might not give enough information to be sure whether there were intermediates between the train and the home signal. Or, the next home signal might actually be beyond where the officer and victim were. We are getting into speculation here.

To be clear - My comments were not meant to justify that this is a good system or practice, I was merely trying to explain what the current process is and why it may have failed in this instance. The point being, dropping the signal is considered an option to be considered as a last resort and "in case of dire emergency" - and the reality of current practice (for better or worse) is, a trespasser on the tracks is likely not considered that dire an emergency.

- Paul

 

[Allandale25]

 

[anb]

How much do you wanna bet 80% of this "customer volume" are really just bikes stacked one against another in the way of each car door. This is getting ridiculous and there's an obvious fix but they don't want to engage in improving the service.

 

[PinkLucy]

I went in and out of the city by GO today. Super busy with Caribbean Festival travellers.

 

[Willybru21]

Niagara GO station suffers from an extremely poor design of only having half the train stop near the station where everyone is, and the other half where nobody is. Because of this nobody moves down the platform as they expect the train to stop along the full platform, which causes people to bunch up at one end where the parking lot, and bus terminal is, leaving the other end almost completely empty for the entire trip.

This can be rectified by having the train pull up along the entire platform, up to a little bit past the station building, spreading the passenger load along a greater part of the train, and giving people with accessibility needs a closer accessibility platform.
However if GO were to do that, it introduces a conflict between GO and the Maple Leaf, and two trains wouldn’t be able to use the single platform anymore, but this only happens a few times a week so multiple Niagara trains suffer for a conflict that happens only every so often.

Until the station is rebuilt with two platforms, I think the Niagara station will just have to continue suffering with this design.

The crowds were also so bad today that I almost lost my phone trying to exit the train as everyone entered, which kind of inspired me to post this rant.

 

[nfitz]

Wouldn't typical GO signage showing the number of cars, etc., rectify things.

Though doesn't the train sit for a while before it leaves?

 

[Undead]

The CSR person should be on the intercom multiple times telling people to move along into the empty part.

 

[SkylineHorizons]

^ not trying to defend Metrolinx here but I wonder if this passage gives rise to some constructive improvements. Like maybe a priority message to a train operating crew can override an automated hot box detector message?

There is nothing fail-safe in this.... the crew may have been distracted and failed to switch over exactly on time, or inadvertently chose the wrong channel, or the channel is in use when they switch over so they disregard any conversation on the new channel for a bit. The RTC has a choice of continuing to hail the train on the "correct" channel in hopes they respond, or try hailing them on the old (or some other) channel until contact is made. There is an element of patience to all this as it regularly takes several tries (or several minutes) to make contact.

Indeed this is a fairly complicated scenario, for starters there's two different rail authorities. There's the RTC who's job is to direct the movement of all trains on a subdivision(s), meaning their focus is not just GO trains. And there's MX Rail Operations who gives operational instructions solely to GO trains. Transportation Safety officers, TSO for short, are MX employees and interface with Rail Ops. Transmissions from rail ops are done over a UHF radio which doesn't interfere with VHF transmissions and both can transmit at the same time. But try listening to and holding two conversations at once, things can easily be missed. Also all transmissions coming from the UHF(rail ops) will take a backseat to HBD broadcasts. Crews are expected to direct their full attention towards the HBD while the entire train is going over one. It doesn't help that the engines are loud and crews can be performing multiple tasks at once. For example in that particular location the engineer would also be expected to initiate his brake application for Burlington station or to start it shortly thereafter. Tragic as the loss of life from someone walking along the tracks may be the fact remains that they should not have been there in the first place. Hot box detectors meanwhile broadcast vital information about potential failures which if ignored could lead to catastrophic consequences up to and including the derailment of a train which could lead to a huge number of fatalities of the completely innocent people on board. It's simply a matter of priorty, their lives obviously take precedent over that of any trespasser.

If a problem is detected the HBD will almost immediately make an open broadcast on the standby channel in regards to the problem. If no problem is detected the HBD will still make an open broadcast but only after the entire train has passed over the detector(usually delayed by a few seconds after the final coach passes over it). Basically the entire time a train is going over an HBD the crews will be keenly focused on listening for any alarms broadcast from it on the VHF. Any broadcast coming from the UHF made during that time will only be responded to after the HBD broadcast is made. The HBD broadcast also overrides all other VHF radio communications while it is being transmitted, at least in the area in question. Because of its importance, radio transmissions from it are strong enough to overpower any and all others made in the area. So if the RTC was trying to contact the train as it was getting an HBD reading his transmission would have been overpowered by it. And even if he called them just before they got their broadcast the crew would not respond back to him right away until after they receive their HBD reading because they could inadvertently transmit over their own HBD broadcast as you cannot broadcast and receive a transmission on the radio at the exact same time. For the entire time you press down on the receiver no transmissions can be heard(other trains in the area will hear the most powerful broadcast source). Obviously this is done to avoid confusion, last thing you need is to have another transmission going off when your in the middle of trying to have a conversation. For the record RTC's do not know exactly when a train is going over an HBD, they only know that a train is somewhere inside the same block. So you always wait until you get your reading first and then only after receiving a good reading do you respond back to anyone calling you on the VHF OR the UHF. Besides it's not like it takes up a huge amount of time, a train going 60-odd mph which GO trains should be traveling at that point, would only need to dedicate about 20 seconds to the entire task. But unfortunately that could make the difference between stopping in time for a trespasser ahead or not.

Further away from the location of a HBD, broadcasts from it can still be heard but can be overpower by other closer sources of radio transmissions but only in those areas far enough away from HBD's. Every train that goes over an active HBD must receive a broadcast from it. If an HBD reading is missed the train must immediately slow down to a set speed(35mph) and contact the RTC to ascertain their reading. The RTC can usually look up HBD readings but if they can't for whatever reason the train that missed its reading will either be require to stop and perform and inspection of the entire train - the preferred option, or they can proceed to the next HBD at the reduced speed - the not preferred considering how far apart they usually are, about 20 or so miles. Phew, explaining all that was a mouthful.

The HBD between Aldershot and Burlington is quite simply in a bad location for GO trains. The MX portion of the Oakville sub starts just east of that HBD which has a different stb channel - stb channel of the CN owned and controlled portion of the Oakville sub. Normally trains are suppose to switch over to a new stb channel just before or precisely when they enter that territory. There is some leeway, but trains should not be on a different stb channel once they've entered into the new territory. Unfortunately GO trains have to stay on the CN stb channel even after entering into the MX controled territory to wait for that particular detector to broadcast its reading. Thing is, it's CN's detector. They have no problems with it being where it is and they certainly don't give a **** about whatever problems it may cause for GO trains.
Edited for language

 

[SkylineHorizons]

.

If there really was 6 minutes between the request and the collision, then how many signals were passed? I don't know the area in particular, but surely there are frequent signals in that area. Wouldn't that stop the train even if there problems communicating by radio?

As a layman, this seems to defeat the point of having signals - which I'd think would a red would override anything that was called into the operator.

How many signals were passed? Wouldn't a yellow, followed by a red, let the train stop safely, without creating havoc, well before the location? And then follow-up with a call.

There's 3 signals between Aldershot and Burlington, though the first one is right at Aldershot so it's quickly passed and isn't even a controlled one on all tracks. So really there's just two signals before Burlington. But you don't just drop signals to red/stop, that's not how signaling for heavy rail works. There are very specific protocols in place set by the rules as mandated by Transport Canada for when an RTC can drop a light. The system will physically only allow them to change a trains routing with 3 blocks notice, meaning the RTC can change a signal to stop at any time but only with that much notice. Any less however and it can only be done in two instances. One - before the RTC can drop a signal in less than 3 blocks they must first contact the crew and ascertain from the engineer that the train can safely stop prior to reaching the signal in question. If the engineer confirms that he can do so, only then can the RTC drop the signal to stop. And two - in emergency situations, that is something which could endanger the safe passage of a train i.e. a washout or a truck on the tracks. Unfortunately for trespassers, they do not pose a threat to the safe passage of a train and if they threw up red lights for every trespasser reported on the tracks the system would be an operational disaster. If you don't agree with it you can always try lobbying Transport Canada to change the rules.

Don't get me wrong the system and rules aren't perfect and there's plenty of faults to be found with the railways. But you can only protect people from their own stupidity so much and even less so when there's intent.

On subway platforms, anyone can stop the trains, with the emergency power button. I've not really heard of much abuse of this. I wonder if there needs to be some kind of equivalent for frequent heavy rail.

Subways don't have the same regulations that heavy rail does, the rules and requirements for each are not the same. Besides I can see how makes sense for subway trains because they can safely and quickly stop without undo wear and possible damage to equipment due to their relatively light weight. Also its one thing to turn off the power source, which you can remotely do for subways but not GO trains, and quite another to randomly throw up a stop signal in front of a speeding train. Lastly that emergency power off button is there just as much for the electrocution risk as anything else, which isn't an issue on our heavy rail lines.

 

[Willybru21]

Wouldn't typical GO signage showing the number of cars, etc., rectify things.

Though doesn't the train sit for a while before it leaves?

Yeah it sits there for roughly 25-40 minutes depending on what trip it is, people do not move.
There are station attendants with megaphones, and the CSA is making multiple announcements, people do not move.
Niagara is beyond signage, it needs a new design, it’s the only way to help rectify the extreme crowding.