steveintoronto
Superstar
Got to completely agree. I'm flummoxed with the claims I've read for this being a "relief line". Not as envisaged in "Phase 1". I'm having trouble with a lot of the figures presented, will get back to those later, but as it stands, I call it "The Pape Entitlement Line". I defy any level of government involved in this to present a *completely unbiased and non-related agency business case* for this to go ahead as presented. It's not quite as absurd as the SSE, but damn close.To have a simple name in the beginning it could be called the East Downtown line until it becomes more representative
*ALL* projects of this massive cost should be run past *third party audits* with figures derived from independent assays.
Transit projects often fall far short of the promises made: James
The planners, the politicians and the public, are all swept along in a furious spending binge with no guarantees of success.
https://www.thestar.com/news/city_h...all-far-short-of-the-promises-made-james.html
http://flyvbjerg.plan.aau.dk/liewithnumbers.php[...]
Forecasting, too, has its dark side. It is here "planners lie with numbers," as Wachs (1989) has aptly put it. Planners on the dark side are busy, not with getting forecasts right and following the AICP Code of Ethics, but with getting projects funded and built. And accurate forecasts are often not an effective means for achieving this objective. Indeed, accurate forecasts may be counterproductive, whereas biased forecasts may be effective in competing for funds and securing the go-ahead for construction. "The most effective planner," says Wachs (1989, 477), "is sometimes the one who can cloak advocacy in the guise of scientific or technical rationality." Such advocacy would stand in direct opposition to AICP's ruling that "the planner's primary obligation [is] to the public interest" (American Planning Association 1991, B.2). Nevertheless, seemingly rational forecasts that underestimate costs and overestimate benefits have long been an established formula for project approval (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter 2003). Forecasting is here mainly another kind of rent-seeking behavior, resulting in a make-believe world of misrepresentation which makes it extremely difficult to decide which projects deserve undertaking and which do not. The consequence is, as even one of the industry's own organs, the Oxford-based Major Projects Association, acknowledges, that too many projects proceed that should not. We would like to add that many projects don't proceed that probably should, had they not lost out to projects with "better" misrepresentation (Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl 2002).
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