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I would offer the Ottawa public transit P3 debacle as the case for someone who understands what's being built, what that costs, and how it works to a great degree.

The Ottawa LRT has spent almost as much time closed and open since it began operations; and it would appear that senior management both in the public sector and the private consortia simply did not know what
they were doing.

Alstom is now saying that tracks were not built to its required specifications, and others have noted that Alstom chose an untested design for its wheel assembliess.

So here is a thing - I can think of almost zero situations where a company CEO would have the time to delve into the nitty gritty of the specifications likely that. That is a waste of their time. They should be hiring experienced technical staff to review bid proposals against their own requirements. They should setup an internal team that does that, and a process to have proposals reviewed, evaluated, discussed, etc. Then they need to make sure their contract management/compliance team is just as strong, if not stronger, because contractors are mofos. We can smell blood. If it comes down to the CEO noticing that the turning radii in the spec isn't right, then that organization or project is so fucked. Him catching it won't matter because he hired all the wrong people.

It is funny that you mention Ottawa.
The first CEO of Rideau was an engineer, with a background at ACS infrastructure. His replacement was also an Engineer and when he was hired, he was already their Technical Director for the whole construction.
But clearly the CEOs never setup a good team for the consortium, which you would think should be easy given they would have had technical talent aplenty available from SNC Lavalin, ACS Infrastructure, and Ellisdon. You got to set it up right, being an engineer doesn't necessarily make that easier. You don't set it up right, you get siloing, poor coordination, and other bullshit.

On the municipal side, there would have been engineers, technologists, etc. a plenty. Take a look at job postings for any municipal public works, and those are requirements. They hire technical people. The boss at that time had 30+ years with Ottawa transportation/public works.

It also sounds like Ottawa city set a stupid budget that made no sense and did all the usual dumb stuff that municipal politicians like to do. Ottawa, to me, is the exact situation when you need leaders with these different skills. Dealing with government is not a technical problem. Setting up a construction consortium is building a business moreso than anything. As a client managing that P3 consortium is not the same as building the choo-choos and tracks.

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Having someone at the top who could be bamboozled by technical staff or their corporate overlords and has no idea what a bearing is or how tight a turning radii ought to be for a train leaves open an incredible risk.

Of course, I oppose P3s entirely for reasons I've outlined elsewhere, and I won't belabour that.

But whether you look at Ottawa, or closer to home with the Eglinton Crosstown, where rails were laid incorrectly, and where radios were installed that were not compatible with the operator's radio network (TTC), I don't think P3 staff should be trusted with billions of the public purse without knowledgeable oversight.

That doesn't have to be the CEO; but the problem is VIA HFR (as opposed to VIA) has no technical staff of its own; without a background in the rail sector, how do you even know who to hire to assist you?

I would be very skeptical of a CEO who spent their time poring over drawings and engineering calculations to the degree where they could spot this kind of design disconnect. (I have seen senior execs who liked to do this - and generally they were ineffective leaders, in the wrong roles - because in fact they were excellent technical people, but managing a team that is solving a problem is about gathering information and aligning various units and stakeholders.... and not being the one who could troubleshoot or identify the technical flaw).

The question is, were there people at lower levels who observed these issues - and did the organization and hierarchy encourage them to speak up, and how did the organization respond when they did. And did the designers work as a team or in silos.

From what I have read of the Ottawa inquiry, it's very apparent that the mentality set by project leadership was "get it done, don't create issues don't admit to problems". And some disfunctional left hand-right hand relationships among the various contractors and the City team.

- Paul
 
@wopchop and @crs1026 I'm happy enough to concur w/your thoughts; I just worry about bringing in someone who doesn't know what questions to ask.

I'm not suggesting the CEO do the engineer's job; just know enough to ask the engineer the right questions, or whether the 'owner's engineer' is asking the right questions.

I'll grant my bias here, but I really liked David Gunn as head of TTC.....he could get lost under a bus or a train w/the best of'em but also knew how to pick up litter and run the train on time.

Equally Andy Byford, who was not an engineer, but came up from station management, and understood how to manage people, how customers react, how to deal w/emergencies, what tends to break, how to be prepared, etc.

When the Governor of NY State tried to foist questionable tech on him, he knew enough to say 'no'.

****

I'm not hung up on credentials here, most UT'ers, and many Parks Staff would trust my opinions on Parks design and I've never been near a Landscape Architecture program.

All I'm looking for is evidence that someone will understand what to ask.
 
@wopchop and @crs1026 I'm happy enough to concur w/your thoughts; I just worry about bringing in someone who doesn't know what questions to ask.

I'm not suggesting the CEO do the engineer's job; just know enough to ask the engineer the right questions, or whether the 'owner's engineer' is asking the right questions.

I'll grant my bias here, but I really liked David Gunn as head of TTC.....he could get lost under a bus or a train w/the best of'em but also knew how to pick up litter and run the train on time.

Equally Andy Byford, who was not an engineer, but came up from station management, and understood how to manage people, how customers react, how to deal w/emergencies, what tends to break, how to be prepared, etc.

When the Governor of NY State tried to foist questionable tech on him, he knew enough to say 'no'.
Obviously there are all kinds of people who can succeed. I am not trying to say otherwise. I don't know this guy they hired, and don't really have an opinion on him. I simply have an issue with certain criticism and generalizations that don't make sense to me.

However, I would like to point out that neither Gunn or Byford were engineers. But they did have extensive backgrounds in operations and administration. Most importantly, they were/are leaders.
 
All I'm looking for is evidence that someone will understand what to ask.

If you added Gary Webster to your list, you'd have my top 3 heroes of transit nailed. All three knew how to speak truth to power..... and look where it got each of them.

I'm deeply afraid that the political pressure and the temptation to talk in grand terms about things that aren't well understood will be alive and well in this project.... but I'm not sure that the right CEO selection will prevent this. The wrong CEO who can talk a blue streak but not drive the right behaviours and decisions will certainly make things go south quick (....cough.....Metrolinx.....cough....). But a technically proficient CEO who can't talk truth to power will fail also.

- Paul
 
Charger/Venture at TMC today:

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I wonder when they will test out lengthening the standard set. I recall from reading their presentations that they could be extended to 8 coaches
 
I wonder when they will test out lengthening the standard set. I recall from reading their presentations that they could be extended to 8 coaches
Given that the extra cars needed to extend to 7 car-sets (the longest configuration, IIRC) are not the same which are decoupled for forming a 3-car set (the shortest configuration), I somewhat doubt that we’ll see much of the non-standard-length trainsets in actual operations…
 
I have lost track - is this set # 6 that is being delivered? One would hope to see more intensive utilisation of the new trains in revenue service.

And, in turn, we should start to see a line forming with decommissioned LRC and Ren coaches that are at end of life. So far, I haven't heard of any official removal of cars from the fleet - but some may already be "Stored Unserviceable".

- Paul
 
I have lost track - is this set # 6 that is being delivered? One would hope to see more intensive utilisation of the new trains in revenue service.

And, in turn, we should start to see a line forming with decommissioned LRC and Ren coaches that are at end of life. So far, I haven't heard of any official removal of cars from the fleet - but some may already be "Stored Unserviceable".

- Paul
This is set #7.

Reportedly there were "dozens" of LRCs cars stored at MMC that are never likely to turn a wheel in revenue service again.

I don't know if I believe the quantity is "dozens", but there people who track these things that have noted that there are cars that haven't been put into service since March 2020.

Dan
 
This is set #7.

Reportedly there were "dozens" of LRCs cars stored at MMC that are never likely to turn a wheel in revenue service again.

I don't know if I believe the quantity is "dozens", but there people who track these things that have noted that there are cars that haven't been put into service since March 2020.

Dan
Who knows when VIA financial massaging will deem those LRC cars sufficiently depreciated to begin their next life as pop cans. Such matters (and leases, and legal disputes) seem to keep all manner of rolling stock occupying sidings in the U.S. for little or no purpose - the Super Steel Turboliners sat for a long time before settlement allowed them to be moved to Connecticut to be shot up by practicing cops. And of course the off lease LRC trainsets sat around at MMC for a long time.
 
Who knows when VIA financial massaging will deem those LRC cars sufficiently depreciated to begin their next life as pop cans. Such matters (and leases, and legal disputes) seem to keep all manner of rolling stock occupying sidings in the U.S. for little or no purpose - the Super Steel Turboliners sat for a long time before settlement allowed them to be moved to Connecticut to be shot up by practicing cops. And of course the off lease LRC trainsets sat around at MMC for a long time.
And we only have one train set in service?
 
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