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If only electric trains and no horns at crossings and they do proper vibration abatement they will barely notice them.

There are two street crossings (Lawrence Ave, Bond Ave) and two trail crossings (Overland Dr, Talwood Park). I would expect zero at-grade crossings to remain if they were to actually go through with this. I think the upsetting part is losing the very lovely linear park, not the noise, but then I don't live there.

The Richmond Hill line is also constrained by CN not wanting any additional GO traffic north of Steeles in its corridor. I don't think the 407 bypass solves that.
 
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There are two street crossings (Lawrence Ave, Bond Ave) and two trail crossings (Overland Dr, Talwood Park). I would expect zero at-grade crossings to remain if they were to actually go through with this. I think the upsetting part is losing the very lovely linear park, not the noise, but then I don't live there.

The Richmond Hill line is also constrained by CN not wanting any additional GO traffic north of Steeles in its corridor. I don't think the 407 bypass solves that.
Lawrence would get an overpass and Bond would be dead ended, as well as the trail crossings.

Theres space to put track and a trail, albeit it will be more something like the new Railpath, not very naturey.
 
True, but that only creates a justification to put CP in the bypass. The question being debated is, what justification is there to include CN, assuming there is already a solid solution to sharing the Halton Sub among CN, ML, and VIA. The argument is, it gives ML sole ownership of the entire Kitchener line.
Including CP opens up more lines to Metrolinx and strengthens the case of a bypass.
The two options are:
  • work out a sharing solution with CN (with the benefit of lessons learned in the Kingston Sub fiasco) and take the risk of having to hold them to it......or.........
  • build a bypass, shift CN to the bypass and enjoy sole control of the Halton Sub.
While I appreciate the value that sole ownership provides, the question is - how much more will that bypass cost over the shared deal. We have no data, but I would speculate that the added cost (dollars plus possible legal challenge and delay) of the bypass is material. (and maybe eyepopping)

- Paul
Working out a sharing solution with CN that results in frequent and reliable passenger trains may not be as simple as you think. And it doesn't free up the Milton Line/North Toronto sub.
 
Sorry hun can you give me access to your hard drive and computer to download that file, thanks
This is the site; you can download from here.


Both articles raise concerns but neither conclude that it is not do-able. I hadn't thought about any radio-type communications that have to take place in proximity.

Safety protocols would have to be robust. If you notice an lower voltage distribution-level circuit or even a metal road guiderail that is near or runs under a transmission corridor, they are heavily grounded. As well, both parties would demand safe and unimpeded maintenance access.
 
Including CP opens up more lines to Metrolinx and strengthens the case of a bypass.

Working out a sharing solution with CN that results in frequent and reliable passenger trains may not be as simple as you think. And it doesn't free up the Milton Line/North Toronto sub.
But we have already worked it out? We literally just finished a multi-year long project to reconfigure Bayview Junction to allow for reliable 30m service to West Harbour and Confederation, and we already have a solution worked out with CN that will allow frequent train service beyond Bramalea to Kitchener, including building a large flyover at Heritage Road so that GO trains can cross the CN tracks unimpeded?
 
The Kingston Sub is where VIA ran out of money and was unable to install enough track to assure its operational reliability.

I'm sure CN pointed out how much ML needed to invest in the Halton Sub to stay clear of freight trains. If ML chose to pay less, well, you get what you pay for. But we don't know.

Point being, that full investment in a reliable routing is still likely less than the cost of a bypass.

- Paul
Is there any more detailed history of the planning and construction of the York & Halton Subs and MacMillan Yard, along with the abandonment of CN's downtown operations and re-envisioning of that land as Metro Centre? Unfortunately Stevens' 1973 history only touches briefly on it (a single paragraph) in the penultimate chapter and his earlier two-volume 1962 set doesn't have anything, despite that construction being contemporaneous with the writing / publishing of the books.

@smallspy / @ShonTron same question to you guys?
 
Is there any more detailed history of the planning and construction of the York & Halton Subs and MacMillan Yard, along with the abandonment of CN's downtown operations and re-envisioning of that land as Metro Centre? Unfortunately Stevens' 1973 history only touches briefly on it (a single paragraph) in the penultimate chapter and his earlier two-volume 1962 set doesn't have anything, despite that construction being contemporaneous with the writing / publishing of the books.

@smallspy / @ShonTron same question to you guys?

I have collected many press clippings from that project. Anything in particular you would like to know?
It would make a great article for some heritage publication..... hmmm....

- Paul

PS - The one comment I would make is, the vision of freight railroading withdrawing from the centre of the city, and the emergence of a commuter rail network on the lines that freight abandoned, was evident from the very start. The appreciation of the enormous commercial value of the railway lands appears to have come later.
 
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I have collected many press clippings from that project. Anything in particular you would like to know?
It would make a great article for some heritage publication..... hmmm....

- Paul

PS - The one comment I would make is, the vision of freight railroading withdrawing from the centre of the city, and the emergence of a commuter rail network on the lines that freight abandoned, was evident from the very start. The appreciation of the commercial value of the railway lands appears to have come later.
Thanks, Paul, that sounds fascinating. Nothing in particular, only that it was an enormous 'megaproject' of its time and I think it would make a cool history. I'd certainly read it!
 
Not that anyone cares, but the key historical learning points I would offer are

- CN understood by the mid to late 1950s that freight railroading was incompatible with the growth of downtown Toronto, and by that early date they foresaw the depletion of industry and freight business in central Toronto. Pretty foresighted, if you ask me

- The idea of a commuter network was raised immediately, but the main concern was the potential for this to require subsidy. The whole concept of subsidy was taboo until Premiers Frost and Davis realized that commuter rail was a helluva lot cheaper than expanding the highway network to accommodate the growing volume of auto commuters trying to reach downtown Toronto. Building GO was much cheaper than adding lanes of highway.

- One has to appreciate, the Gardiner and DVP were only being built at the time the bypass was planned - and while there was a network of expressways planned, the huge cost of that investment weighed heavily on the pols who had to raise the money.. Into the mid 1960's, TTC was boasting about turning a profit at the farebox.....the financing cost of the Line 2 subway is what erased the idea that transit in Toronto could run in the black. it took many years to get past the idea that a shortfall at the fare box was not acceptable.

- The ability to remove the roundhouses and coach yards from downtown Toronto, and reclaim that land for development, was appreciated in the 1970s but wasn't really credible until VIA Rail Canada happened and Ottawa funded the shift of rail pax facilities to a new facility in the early 1980's. Until then, CN was not really operating on a commercial basis and the appetite for monetising those facilities did not emerge. CP with its Real Estate division was more profit oriented, but the pre VIA and early VIA funding formula compensated them for all that. CP was well compensated for continuing its (unneeded) passenger roundhouse and coachyard on some very valuable real estate, until VIA moved off the property..

- CN had two alternative bypass routes planned and put forward for public commentary. There was profound public debate on the impacts, The scope of grade separation was the most contentious point. The number of specific residences and community impacts was relatively small by present standards (24 residences on Pape Ave alone today....versus a similar number for the whole Dunbarton routing......) but this was hotly debated. In the end, the more central routing was selected in preference to a more northerly crossing.

- There was ample warning to north-end municipalities to not develop too close to the right of way (it was all farmland back then)....which the municipalities subsequently disregarded, with various levels of small- and large-C corruption in municipal zoning and urban planning decisions.

And the rest is history. If I did an article, this would be the synopsis.



- Paul
 
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Not that anyone cares, but the key historical learning points I would offer are
- CN understood by the mid to late 1950s that freight railroading was incompatible with downtown Toronto, and by that early date they foresaw the depletion of industry and freight business in central Toronto. Pretty foresighted, if you ask me
- The immediate question was the idea of a commuter network, but the main concern was the potential for this to require subsidy. The whole concept of subsidy was taboo until Premiers Frost and Davis realized that commuter rail was a helluva lot cheaper than expanding the highway network to accommodate the growing volume of auto commuters trying to reach downtown Toronto. Building GO was much cheaper than adding lanes of highway.
- One has to appreciate, the Gardiner and DVP were only being built at the time the bypass was planned - and while there was a network of expressways planned, the huge cost of that investment weighed heavily on the pols who had to raise the money.. Into the mid 1960's, TTC was boasting about turning a profit at the farebox.....the financing cost of the Line 2 subway is what erased the idea that transit in Toronto could run in the black. it took many years to get past the idea that a shortfall at the fate box was acceptable.
- The ability to remove the roundhouses and coach yards from downtown Toronto, and reclaim that land for development, was appreciated in the 1970s but wasn't really credible until VIA Rail Canada happened and Ottawa funded the shift of rail pax facilities to a new facility in the early 1980's. Until then, CN was not really operating on a commercial basis and the appetite for monetising those facilities did not emerge. CP with its Real Estate division was more profit oriented, but the pre VIA and early VIA funding formula compensated them for all that. CP was well compensated for continuing its (unneeded) passenger roundhouse and coachyard on some very valuable real estate, until VIA moved off the property..
- CN had two alternative routes planned and put forward for public commentary. There was profound public debate on the impacts, The scope of grade separation was the most contentious point. The number of specific residences and community impacts was relatively small by present standards (24 residences on Pape Ave alone today....versus a similar number for the whole Dunbarton routing......) but this was hotly debated. In the end, the more central routing was selected in preference to a more northerly crossing.
- There was ample warning to north-end municipalities to not develop too close to the right of way (it was all farmland back then)....which the municipalities subsequently disregarded, with various levels of small- and large-C corruption in municipal zoning and urban planning decisions.

And the rest is history. If I did an article, this would be the synopsis.



- Paul
To add to your first point, the envisioned salt water marine traffic from the opening of the Seaway in 1959 never materialized. The warehouses and terminals built by the Port of Toronto (or the feds, I can't remember) never drew the freight volume that was expected, and the grain industry found it was cheaper to keep it on the train to Montreal or tidewater, and exploit new markets in Asia.

I remember when the new subdivisions and MacMillan yard were opened. It was indeed all farmland, lots of rural level crossings.
 
Not that anyone cares, but the key historical learning points I would offer are

- CN understood by the mid to late 1950s that freight railroading was incompatible with the growth of downtown Toronto, and by that early date they foresaw the depletion of industry and freight business in central Toronto. Pretty foresighted, if you ask me

- The idea of a commuter network was raised immediately, but the main concern was the potential for this to require subsidy. The whole concept of subsidy was taboo until Premiers Frost and Davis realized that commuter rail was a helluva lot cheaper than expanding the highway network to accommodate the growing volume of auto commuters trying to reach downtown Toronto. Building GO was much cheaper than adding lanes of highway.

- One has to appreciate, the Gardiner and DVP were only being built at the time the bypass was planned - and while there was a network of expressways planned, the huge cost of that investment weighed heavily on the pols who had to raise the money.. Into the mid 1960's, TTC was boasting about turning a profit at the farebox.....the financing cost of the Line 2 subway is what erased the idea that transit in Toronto could run in the black. it took many years to get past the idea that a shortfall at the fare box was not acceptable.

- The ability to remove the roundhouses and coach yards from downtown Toronto, and reclaim that land for development, was appreciated in the 1970s but wasn't really credible until VIA Rail Canada happened and Ottawa funded the shift of rail pax facilities to a new facility in the early 1980's. Until then, CN was not really operating on a commercial basis and the appetite for monetising those facilities did not emerge. CP with its Real Estate division was more profit oriented, but the pre VIA and early VIA funding formula compensated them for all that. CP was well compensated for continuing its (unneeded) passenger roundhouse and coachyard on some very valuable real estate, until VIA moved off the property..

- CN had two alternative bypass routes planned and put forward for public commentary. There was profound public debate on the impacts, The scope of grade separation was the most contentious point. The number of specific residences and community impacts was relatively small by present standards (24 residences on Pape Ave alone today....versus a similar number for the whole Dunbarton routing......) but this was hotly debated. In the end, the more central routing was selected in preference to a more northerly crossing.

- There was ample warning to north-end municipalities to not develop too close to the right of way (it was all farmland back then)....which the municipalities subsequently disregarded, with various levels of small- and large-C corruption in municipal zoning and urban planning decisions.

And the rest is history. If I did an article, this would be the synopsis.



- Paul
Thank you, Paul. Now you have to write that article!

For completeness here, this is all that appears about the bypass and abandonment of downtown Toronto facilities in Stevens' seminal CN history. Keen eyes will also note CN's involvement in Main Square at Main Street and Danforth:

IMG_8457.jpeg


To add to your first point, the envisioned salt water marine traffic from the opening of the Seaway in 1959 never materialized. The warehouses and terminals built by the Port of Toronto (or the feds, I can't remember) never drew the freight volume that was expected, and the grain industry found it was cheaper to keep it on the train to Montreal or tidewater, and exploit new markets in Asia.

I remember when the new subdivisions and MacMillan yard were opened. It was indeed all farmland, lots of rural level crossings.
The Seaway failure is a funny home-grown conundrum: Canada, not the United States, was the one to ultimately pull the trigger, but in true Canadian fashion, we penny pinched and built the locks too small for the ever-growing salties. That said, with the rise of intermodal containerization, no Canadian city (outside of Montreal which lies at the top of the system) was equipped or interested in pursuing that kind of port facility.
 
Not that anyone cares, but the key historical learning points I would offer are

- CN understood by the mid to late 1950s that freight railroading was incompatible with the growth of downtown Toronto, and by that early date they foresaw the depletion of industry and freight business in central Toronto. Pretty foresighted, if you ask me

- The idea of a commuter network was raised immediately, but the main concern was the potential for this to require subsidy. The whole concept of subsidy was taboo until Premiers Frost and Davis realized that commuter rail was a helluva lot cheaper than expanding the highway network to accommodate the growing volume of auto commuters trying to reach downtown Toronto. Building GO was much cheaper than adding lanes of highway.

- One has to appreciate, the Gardiner and DVP were only being built at the time the bypass was planned - and while there was a network of expressways planned, the huge cost of that investment weighed heavily on the pols who had to raise the money.. Into the mid 1960's, TTC was boasting about turning a profit at the farebox.....the financing cost of the Line 2 subway is what erased the idea that transit in Toronto could run in the black. it took many years to get past the idea that a shortfall at the fare box was not acceptable.

- The ability to remove the roundhouses and coach yards from downtown Toronto, and reclaim that land for development, was appreciated in the 1970s but wasn't really credible until VIA Rail Canada happened and Ottawa funded the shift of rail pax facilities to a new facility in the early 1980's. Until then, CN was not really operating on a commercial basis and the appetite for monetising those facilities did not emerge. CP with its Real Estate division was more profit oriented, but the pre VIA and early VIA funding formula compensated them for all that. CP was well compensated for continuing its (unneeded) passenger roundhouse and coachyard on some very valuable real estate, until VIA moved off the property..

- CN had two alternative bypass routes planned and put forward for public commentary. There was profound public debate on the impacts, The scope of grade separation was the most contentious point. The number of specific residences and community impacts was relatively small by present standards (24 residences on Pape Ave alone today....versus a similar number for the whole Dunbarton routing......) but this was hotly debated. In the end, the more central routing was selected in preference to a more northerly crossing.

- There was ample warning to north-end municipalities to not develop too close to the right of way (it was all farmland back then)....which the municipalities subsequently disregarded, with various levels of small- and large-C corruption in municipal zoning and urban planning decisions.

And the rest is history. If I did an article, this would be the synopsis.



- Paul

Re "CN had two alternative bypass routes planned and put forward for public commentary."

I don't think I've ever seen a map of the alternatives to the York Sub. Do you have a copy? cc @Willybru21
 
The Seaway failure is a funny home-grown conundrum: Canada, not the United States, was the one to ultimately pull the trigger, but in true Canadian fashion, we penny pinched and built the locks too small for the ever-growing salties. That said, with the rise of intermodal containerization, no Canadian city (outside of Montreal which lies at the top of the system) was equipped or interested in pursuing that kind of port facility.
The dimensions of the Seaway were built to match those of the Welland Canal.
 

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