[crs1026]

I find it interesting how the California experience is being described (just about everywhere) as a failure.

I see it as a resounding success, in the sense that somebody actually is driving a HSR line to the finish line in North America (for all its detractors, California is too far along to be cancellable) and that prototype has created a wealth of experience that will provide a cautionary tale for future projects, mostly about what to avoid and what has to change before a project can succeed. (In California's case, the biggest lessons learned are, a) do not let local politicians have undue influence and b) there is a time for input - but once the debate over do it/don't do it is over, do not allow litigation by individual interests that is aimed at reversing that decision stand in the way of just getting it done).

I'm a big believer in letting somebody else blaze the trail and let them pay the price of development. But somebody has to go first, and first efforts are usually painful. So the challenge is to not repeat California's process..... but there is no reason to believe that a VIA project would go bad for the same reasons.

In the private sector, California would be looking at all of this as a collection of IP and trying to recoup their cost overruns by selling and licensing their hard earned experience. That won't happen, but the overspend while sensational is not necessarily money badly spent. Just about every railroad in North America went broke along the way.

- Paul

 

[DirectionNorth]

I find it interesting how the California experience is being described (just about everywhere) as a failure.

I see it as a resounding success, in the sense that somebody actually is driving a HSR line to the finish line in North America (for all its detractors, California is too far along to be cancellable) and that prototype has created a wealth of experience that will provide a cautionary tale for future projects, mostly about what to avoid and what has to change before a project can succeed. (In California's case, the biggest lessons learned are, a) do not let local politicians have undue influence and b) there is a time for input - but once the debate over do it/don't do it is over, do not allow litigation that is aimed at reversing that decision stand in the way of just getting it done.

I'm a big believer in letting somebody else blaze the trail and let them pay the price of development. But somebody has to go first, and first efforts are usually painful. So the challenge is to not repeat California's process..... but there is no reason to believe that a VIA project would go bad for the same reasons.

In the private sector, California would be looking at all of this as a collection of IP and trying to recoup their cost overruns by selling and licensing their hard earned experience. That won't happen, but the overspend while sensational is not necessarily money badly spent. Just about every railroad in North America went broke along the way.

- Paul

The Tokaido Shinkansen doubled in cost during construction, and the chief engineer and JNR head both resigned - but they were forgotten once the line opened between Tokyo, Nagoya, Kyoto, and Osaka. That's the deal - there needs to be a line between two places people want to go, even if there are cost overruns.

California isn't going to open the line from San Francisco to Los Angeles anytime soon. Instead, they'll have HSR between Bakersfield and Merced by 2029 (21 years after Prop 1A and 14 years after construction started), stopping in Kings/Tulare, Fresno, and Madera. That's the problem with CAHSR, they've used huge amounts of political capital and regular capital on a line from nowhere to nowhere, created with the deadly combination of US opposition to transit and American costs. Great example to point to on "why we shouldn't build HSR" for the opponents, and I'm not convinced that there are any positive (rather than "avoid") lessons to be taken from CAHSR and the English-speaking world in general.

With Quebec, we could theoretically learn from France, but even the French media only talks about CAHSR. Fingers crossed that the consortiums practice rigorous cost control, they have the strongest incentive to do so.

 

[crs1026]

We have to be a little more granular and focussed about why project costs go up.

On one level, there is the added cost that is created by taking a route that ought to be a straight line and distorting it to align to, or avoid, powerful interests. Cal HSR is certainly a case study of this. The straight-line cost estimate is what was used to sell the project, but the actual cost is what it is.... we make mistakes when we trust the original estimate before these changes are worked out and incorporated.

Then there is the added cost of stretching the timeline because specific segments are blocked, or held up in litigation or some other process. (Such as revisiting or doing addendums to EA's because the route or design changed). For a project this large, the financing costs of all the work performed early are vulnerable - if the project is delayed by four years while some critical piece is argued in court, that's a lot of added financing charges before the line starts to generate revenue.

Then there's the more focussed question of whether constructors can build at the price they thought they could. Here, we fall into the P3 fixed-price fallacy.... as Metrolinx has shown, constructors do find ways of passing on added cost, even if the theory of the deal was "fixed price". No surprise here, old fashioned time and labour contracts had claims processes that did exactly this... P3 is often a convenient ruse to avoid this reality. Shame on us if we don't admit the reality.

Most of these points are raised by detractors and downplayed by the project supporters. It should be the other way round.

- Paul

 

[micheal_can]

We have to be a little more granular and focussed about why project costs go up.

On one level, there is the added cost that is created by taking a route that ought to be a straight line and distorting it to align to, or avoid, powerful interests. Cal HSR is certainly a case study of this. The straight-line cost estimate is what was used to sell the project, but the actual cost is what it is.... we make mistakes when we trust the original estimate before these changes are worked out and incorporated.

Then there is the added cost of stretching the timeline because specific segments are blocked, or held up in litigation or some other process. (Such as revisiting or doing addendums to EA's because the route or design changed). For a project this large, the financing costs of all the work performed early are vulnerable - if the project is delayed by four years while some critical piece is argued in court, that's a lot of added financing charges before the line starts to generate revenue.

Then there's the more focussed question of whether constructors can build at the price they thought they could. Here, we fall into the P3 fixed-price fallacy.... as Metrolinx has shown, constructors do find ways of passing on added cost, even if the theory of the deal was "fixed price". No surprise here, old fashioned time and labour contracts had claims processes that did exactly this... P3 is often a convenient ruse to avoid this reality. Shame on us if we don't admit the reality.

Most of these points are raised by detractors and downplayed by the project supporters. It should be the other way round.

- Paul

Maybe we should actually cost it out instead of 'trying to do it on the cheap'. By this, I mean, put the funding forward for the bid plus. Whether that plus be a simple percentage, or whether it should be simply double the costs, we need to stop basing it on today's dollars, and instead base it on a much inflated price. We expect 2% inflation. That means if this project will take 10 years, we should allocate 20% for the inflated cost. We should also announce that as the new cost.

 

[generalcanada]

Maybe we should actually cost it out instead of 'trying to do it on the cheap'. By this, I mean, put the funding forward for the bid plus. Whether that plus be a simple percentage, or whether it should be simply double the costs, we need to stop basing it on today's dollars, and instead base it on a much inflated price. We expect 2% inflation. That means if this project will take 10 years, we should allocate 20% for the inflated cost. We should also announce that as the new cost.

"cost plus" contracts do not work.
Thats one of the big reasons why the US DOD's spending is so wacked.

"oh yea this soap dispenser cost us $250,000, so we will charge you $300,000"

 

[Urban Sky]

Some of you might remember that I have shared pre-HSR timetables for Germany and the Northeast Corridor here:

Spoiler

InterCity timetable of the main North-South Corridor in Germany prior to the introduction of the InterCityExpress:

Metroliner timetable of the main North East Corridor in the United States prior to the introduction of the Acela Express:

I have now discovered a timetable archive for the Italian State Railroad FS, which has allowed me to create similar tables for Milan-Rome (which happen to be 478.6 km apart "as the crow flies", so only 26 km less than Montreal-Toronto):

https://www.reddit.com/r/ViaRail/comments/1gqui7k/comment/lxg78w8

As you can see below, there were 3 Express (First Class only!), 9 Semi-Express trains and 6 night trains:

As "ec_traindriver" has pointed out, the 1987 timetable already shows most of the "Direttissima" in operation (only the 44 km long segment between Valdarno North and Arezzo South was still under construction and opened in 1992), but train speeds had not yet increased beyond 200 km/h, with 8 Express trains, 1 Semi-Express train and 6 Night Trains:

 

[micheal_can]

"cost plus" contracts do not work.
Thats one of the big reasons why the US DOD's spending is so wacked.

"oh yea this soap dispenser cost us $250,000, so we will charge you $300,000"

Ah, I see where I missed part of the explanation. The today's budget is still what the winning bidder gets,and when they need to go over it, they must justify it.If you look at any project that is more than 3 years long (Such as HSR will be),they always go over budget and then the public complains.

 

[generalcanada]

Ah, I see where I missed part of the explanation. The today's budget is still what the winning bidder gets,and when they need to go over it, they must justify it.If you look at any project that is more than 3 years long (Such as HSR will be),they always go over budget and then the public complains.

That doesnt solve anything. Theyre just going to say its over budget anyway.

 

[micheal_can]

That doesnt solve anything. Theyre just going to say its over budget anyway.

They do now anyways. They also still need to justify it now as well.
The difference would be that when the price goes up, it is already allocated and nothing is made of it. As apposed to another news article about another project over budget.